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who pays attention to the news already knows, the war in 
Afghanistan is not going well. Long overshadowed by the conflict in Iraq, Afghani-
stan’s trials drew little attention in the years after the deceptively easy overthrow of 
the Taliban in 2001. Afghans are paying the price: violence has been escalating since 
2006, and insurgents operate freely in much of the country. 
As everyone
b y  r o b e r t  l o o n e y
Today, eight years after the American- 
induced regime change, the Taliban has re-
emerged as a major player in a country in 
which regional militia commanders and war-
lords remain largely autonomous, and the 
authority of the central government barely 
extends beyond Kabul.
Yet, while the seriousness of the Taliban 
challenge is now widely acknowledged, there 
is no consensus about the cause of this rever-
sal of fortune. Most analysts point to the ini-
tial decision to send inadequate numbers of 
troops to establish security in rural areas, 
once the Taliban had been driven into Paki-
stan. Some note the United States coalition’s 
limited financial commitment to reconstruc-
tion of the war-battered economy. Still others 
cite the mistake of imposing a highly central-
ized government structure on this ethnically 
divided nation – a model that repeatedly 
failed in the past. 
One important factor, however, has re-
ceived far too little attention. Afghanistan’s 
booming opium business is a large and grow-
ing impediment to the authority of the coali-
tion-supported government in Kabul. Over 
the last eight years, the lack of government in 
the countryside has created an ideal breeding 
ground for illicit narcotics trade. Indeed, Af-
ghanistan now produces well over 90 percent 
of the world’s heroin, with a sizable chunk of 
the proceeds from illicit exports going to fi-
nance the Taliban. 
Parodoxically, in its final years the Taliban 
regime reversed course and instituted a strict 
policy against the opium trade, which it justi-
fied on religious grounds. As a result, Afghan-
istan was producing very little opium at the 
time of the United States invasion. But the 
vacuum of authority in rural areas created by 
the Taliban’s defeat was quickly filled by vari-
ous groups bent on restoring the lucrative 
business. Regional warlords, many of whom 
had fought the Russian occupation with 
American arms and money, became major 
players. Some even moved their drug opera-
tions to government ministries after being 
elected to public office.
The Taliban has since changed its mind 
about narcotics, forming alliances with war-
lords and criminal gangs involved in opium 
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smuggling. A Taliban commission collects 
taxes from opium farmers, and, in return, the 
Taliban protects the farmers against the gov-
ernment’s feeble eradication efforts. 
The funds involved are very large, espe-
cially by the standards of this bitterly impov-
erished country. According to estimates by 
the United Nations, warlords and the Taliban 
extracted close to half a billion dollars from 
the illicit trade in 2008 – almost twice the 
country’s earnings from all legal exports. 
As a result, Afghanistan is trapped in a vi-
cious circle of narcotics-led corruption, vio-
lence and economic stagnation. Opium 
money both finances the insurgency and en-
ables the warlords to bribe central govern-
ment officials, thereby preventing the sorts of 
reforms that might give Kabul the political le-
gitimacy and military muscle needed to pac-
ify the countryside. Clearly, success in com-
bating the reconstituted Taliban will require 
breaking the symbiosis between opium and 
insurgency. But that is easier said than done.
growth of the poppy industry
At the time of Afghanistan’s pro-communist 
coup in 1978, Afghan farmers produced a 
modest 300 metric tons of opium annually – 
enough to satisfy regional demand with a bit 
left over for heroin production aimed at 
Western Europe. But since the 1980s, poppy 
cultivation and opium production has 
trended upward during successive periods of 
insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist govern-
ment and, most recently, the regime of Hamid 
Karzai.
Commercial poppy farming emerged as 
rural Afghanistan’s premier industry in the 
early 1990s, after war and anarchy had pushed 
farmers into deep poverty. Poppy cultivation 
became a necessary and highly profitable al-
ternative to conventional crops like wheat 
and fruits, which couldn’t be brought to mar-
ket. The centralization of authority under the 
Taliban during the mid-to-late 1990s further 
fueled Afghan opium production, as Taliban 
officials co-opted their military opponents 
with promises of permissive poppy cultiva-
tion policies and mirrored the practices of 
their warlord predecessors by collecting taxes 
on the expanding volume of production.
In 1999, Afghan production peaked at more 
than 4,500 tons, leading to growing pressure 
for its curtailment from countries with major 
heroin addiction problems. The Taliban re-
sponded in late 2000 by banning opium 
poppy cultivation, though it did allow com-
merce in opiates to continue. Under the ban, 
poppy cultivation was reduced by more than 
90 percent; it continued to flourish only in 
areas controlled by the anti-Taliban Northern 
Alliance forces. 
Though the West initially applauded the 
Taliban’s about-face as a sign of a new willing-
ness to join the international community, the 
enthusiasm was probably premature. Ana-
lysts now believe that the Taliban had a large 
stockpile of opium and heroin on hand from 
previous years of bountiful production, and 
that the ban was simply an attempt to use Af-
ghanistan’s monopoly power to raise prices in 
a weak market.
After September 11, Afghan farmers antici-
pated the fall of the Taliban and resumed 
poppy cultivation, even as United States-led 
military operations began in October 2001. 
International efforts to rebuild Afghanistan’s 
devastated society began with the organiza-
tion of an interim administration at the Bonn 
Conference in December 2001. There, the 
new Afghan government committed to com-
bating the resurgence of the poppy economy 
and requested assistance from the United 
States, Britain and others. 
The Afghan government nominally deliv-
t r e n d s
















ered on its promise, banning poppy growing 
and beginning a halting effort to eradicate the 
crop in the fields. Nonetheless, poppy farming 
blossomed, and Afghanistan re-established 
its position as the world’s leading opium pro-
ducer, with a yield in 2002 exceeding 3,400 
tons. Since then, government interdiction 
and eradication efforts have yielded dismal 
results. 
According to the United Nations, the value 
at the proverbial farm gate of opium culti-
vated in 2007 was one of the largest ever, at 
about $1 billion, while the value of the pro-
cessed opium reaching the export dock was 
many times that amount. In 2008, farmers’ 
income from opium did drop by a quarter. 
But the most likely cause was the Taliban’s de-
cision to tighten world supplies again in order 
to raise export prices – not success in eradica-
tion efforts. 
The pervasiveness of the opium industry 
complicates counter-narcotics policies in Af-
ghanistan. The United Nations estimates that 
7 percent of the Afghan population profits di-
rectly from the drug trade. And this number 
does not include the families of the itinerant 
laborers hired during harvest times, or the 
multiplier effect as drug profits are spent on a 
thousand goods and services in a thousand 
hamlets. U.S. officials point to the real estate 
boom and business activity visible in many 
Afghan cities as signs of economic progress. 
But the reality is that the economic machin-
ery heavily depends on opium for fuel.
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Vicious circles abound. Some 80 to 90 per-
cent of the economy is informal and often il-
licit – meaning entrepreneurs cannot become 
sizable registered businesses and the govern-
ment cannot collect taxes. In turn, a weak 
government with insufficient funds and lim-
ited technical expertise cannot provide the 
economy with the support it needs to grow. 
Nor can it provide the security from violence 
or the infrastructure – everything from health 
care to education – that Afghanistan needs to 
create a civil society.
The opium economy is the linchpin of this 
vicious cycle – a formidable force with a 
vested interest in preventing nation-building. 
And the longer opium dominates the economy 
and polity, the harder it will be to move ahead.
toward a solution?
While NATO alliance members agree on the 
magnitude of the opium threat, there is little 
accord on what to do about it. That’s not sur-
prising in light of the alliance’s problematic ex-
periences in attacking the business in the past. 
Crop Substitution 
In its initial opium eradication effort, Britain 
(the NATO-designated leader in the opium 
war) offered cash payments to farmers who 
agreed not to grow poppies. In 2002, when 
the offer was first made, Afghan farmers pro-
duced 3,400 metric tons of opium. Alas, pro-
duction rose to 3,600 metric tons in 2003, 
and 4,200 metric tons in 2004. 
The most obvious explanation for the pro-
gram’s failure was that growing poppies re-
mained more lucrative than going on the dole. 
In 2003, gross poppy income per hectare (2½ 
acres) was $12,700. And even in 2004, when 
bad weather created relatively poor growing 
conditions, gross income per hectare was 
$4,600. In contrast, the British offered farm-
ers only $1,235 per hectare not to grow pop-
pies, to which another $390 per hectare could 
be earned by growing wheat.
Britain spent $70 million, to little effect. 
Indeed, the policy actually proved to be coun-
terproductive: some farmers planted poppies 
for the first time so that they, too, would be 
paid not to grow them in the future. 
Even when farmers decided to switch crops, 
they were apt to be disappointed. Since there 
was no banking system to deliver the crop-
substitution money, the British were forced to 
disperse the funds through local warlords, who 
diverted much of the money to their own 
purposes – in particular, to buying arms. So 
the scheme was doubly ineffective, losing the 
hearts and minds of the rural population even 
as it bankrolled the anti-coalition warlords. 
Still, new substitution programs continue 
to be proposed. One suggestion is to encour-
age production of high-value crops, like apri-
cots, for which Afghanistan was once famous. 
Unfortunately, it takes seven years for an apri-
cot tree to bear fruit after it is planted, and 
most of the mature trees not devastated dur-
ing the Soviet occupation have been chopped 
down to make room for poppies. 
Kandahar, some 300 miles southwest of 
the capital, produces perhaps the world’s best 
t r e n d s
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pomegranates, a fruit currently in demand 
for its antioxidant content and possible heal-
ing properties. And last November, the Af-
ghan agriculture ministry and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development held a World 
Pomegranate Fair at a model farm on the 
edge of Kabul. The organizers pointed out 
that pomegranate prices had quadrupled in 
five years, making the fruit a potential rival in 
profitability to the poppy. 
But pomegranate cultivation requires both 
capital and infrastructure, which are hardly 
found in abundance in Afghanistan. The cre-
ation of viable pomegranate farms is hin-
dered by a lack of fertilizer and pesticides, a 
poor road network, and shortages of electric-
ity, cold-storage depots and modern packing 
facilities. Add to this depressing picture the 
reality that the only way to get crops out of 
Afghanistan is to fly them out, and it is hard 
not to conclude that the as-yet-unborn pome-
granate industry – for that matter, licit Af-
ghan agriculture in general – is hopelessly un-
competitive in export markets.
The opium poppy’s most potent adversary 
may be its own success. Opium prices have 
dropped over the past four years, almost cer-
tainly because the supply from Afghanistan 
consistently outstripped global demand. 
Meanwhile, grain prices were rising. Hence, 
the net-revenue gap between opium and 
wheat has narrowed from 10:1 to around 3:1. 
But any market-induced switch to grain culti-
vation is probably self-limiting. While rising 
food prices and falling opium prices may in-
duce some voluntary crop substitution, the 
incentive to grow a lot of poppies is likely to 
remain strong because Afghanistan remains 
the best place in the world to grow an illicit 
crop in great volume. 
Eradication
Many United States authorities champion the 
technological fix – aggressive eradication using 
aerial fumigation. But this approach has some 
distinct drawbacks. While it is certainly pos-
sible to destroy a lot of poppies with fungus 
or herbicides, these treatments put licit crops 
grown nearby at risk. The collateral damage 
problem is especially worrisome because 
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United States forces must spray from alti-
tudes high enough to avoid antiaircraft fire. 
And, judging by the experience with high-alti-
tude coca-plant eradication in Colombia, such 
spraying is sure to be inaccurate.
The problem is not hypothetical: back in 
2004, farmers from the eastern Nangarhar 
province complained that the United States 
had sprayed their fields. The Afghan Transi-
tional Government sent a delegation to inves-
tigate, and the minister of health confirmed 
that aerial spraying of an unknown chemical 
had occurred. It reportedly caused serious 
damage to other crops, as well as skin ail-
ments and breathing problems for local resi-
dents. Both the United States and Britain 
have denied any involvement.
Even if it were possible to avoid collateral 
damage in spraying, suppressing opium pro-
duction would face serious obstacles. The 
poppy is such a valuable crop that farmers 
would almost certainly go to great lengths to 
conceal their acreage from prying eyes. Ac-
cordingly, a major forced reduction in poppy 
cultivation could be achieved only if the 
poppy police used draconian means. Under 
the Taliban’s successful (but brief) suppres-
sion of opium farming, enforcers employed 
terror as inducement – punishment for grow-
ing poppies ranging from summary execu-
tion to starvation. In addition, as the history 
of drug eradication programs in Latin Amer-
ica and Asia shows, shutting down produc-
tion in one area more often than not merely 
pushes production to another – from north 
to south in the case of Afghanistan. 
Note, moreover, that a partly successful 
poppy eradication effort in Afghanistan – 
probably the best that could be expected – 
might well increase the revenues generated by 
the remaining crop. It is a safe assumption 
that the demand for raw opium is not very 
sensitive to price changes. So the loss of vol-
ume would be more than made up for by an 
increased price per unit. The likely result: 
even more money available to corrupt the 
governance of Afghanistan and to support 
the Taliban fighters. 
the UnoDC Approach
The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime contends that drugs and poverty must 
be fought simultaneously if there is to be any 
success in breaking the hold of the drug econ-
omy. It’s hard to argue with the agency’s logic: 
if alternative crops cannot generate sufficient 
income, poppy eradication alone would sim-
ply compound poverty, further alienating the 
rural population and depopulating vast 
stretches of Afghanistan.
UNODC offers a laundry list of supple-
mentary measures ranging from the removal 
of corrupt provincial governors to disarming 
private militias to conditioning future devel-
opment assistance for farming communities 
on their success in eradicating poppies. But 
that’s a bit like prescribing the renunciation 
t r e n d s
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if there is to be any success in breaking the hold of the  
drug economy. It’s hard to argue with the agency’s logic.
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of violence as the remedy for war. 
Who is in a position to remove the offend-
ing governors? Who could plausibly argue 
that the new governors would not be as cor-
rupt as their predecessors? Who would dis-
arm the militias? What reason would the war-
lords have to change their savage ways?
Cultivation for Licit Use
If you can’t lick ’em, how about joining ’em? 
Economists, including Deepak Lal of UCLA, 
and think tanks, including the International 
Council on Security and Development (pre-
viously known as the Senlis Council), argue 
that it would make sense to buy the whole Af-
ghan opium poppy crop, then process it for 
medical use. And at least some policymakers 
are inclined to give this approach a try: a pro-
posed pilot program has received the backing 
of the European parliament.
ICOS reasons that the transition would 
kill two proverbial birds with one stone. Their 
analysts argue that “there is significant global 
shortage of opium-based medicines like mor-
phine and codeine” and that the resulting 
“high prices and stringent and inappropriate 
market regulation mean that too many peo-
ple are dying in pain, particularly in the de-
veloping world.” 
The international council suggests that fa-
cilities be built in Afghanistan to process the 
poppy crops into morphine. Such a plan, it 
claims, would help build an Afghani infra-
structure for producing medicines, while 
helping to stabilize regions where insurgency 
is rife. ICOS points to the success of similar 
initiatives in Turkey and India, both of which 
managed to co-opt illicit opium producers by 
purchasing the crop for medical use.
The numbers, however, may not add up. 
Tasmania, Turkey and India currently have 
considerable acreage devoted to poppies. 
There simply may not be sufficient demand 
for medical opiates to absorb the supply now 
available illegally in Afghanistan. Consider, 
too, that conversion of existing poppy acreage 
to legal uses wouldn’t necessarily eliminate 
the incentive to produce opium for the illegal 
market as well. On the contrary: if paying 
farmers not to grow opium has failed to curb 
poppy cultivation, then paying them to grow 
it will most likely increase production. 
Indeed, given the strong demand for illicit 
opiates, poppy cultivation would most likely 
move to more remote locations in Afghani-
stan – thereby preserving the incomes of war-
lords who have a strong interest in destabiliz-
ing the Kabul government and, of course, the 
income of the Taliban fighters. 
muddling through
There is no silver bullet, no good (let alone, 
perfect) way to wean the Afghan economy 
from its dependence on opium in the imme-
diate future. The World Bank, for its part, has 
counseled a pragmatic approach – what it 
calls an “alternative livelihoods” program. 
That seems to be another name for doing the 
best we can to chip away at Afghanistan’s so-
bering economic problems by creating jobs 
and business opportunities in familiar ways: 
investing in job-creating industry and the in-
frastructure (ranging from decent roads to 
education to a functional banking system) re-
quired to support them. To have any chance 
of success, the bank adds, the development 
effort would have to be accompanied by a 
sustained commitment to suppressing opium 
production and denying the Taliban control 
of the countryside. 
Such a program would take time to make 
a decisive difference – if it ever made one at 
all. It took 30 years to eliminate poppy culti-
vation in Thailand. Are Afghanistan’s foreign 
patrons prepared to stay the course? There is 
little reason to be optimistic. m
